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INTRODUCTION  
Publicly reported information on the environmental behavior of firms can increase the efficacy 
of private markets as a mechanism to control environmental malfeasance through liability for 
harm, consumer demand response, and shareholder reaction. Within the realm of environmental 
policy, examples exist of both mandatory information disclosure programs such as the EPA’s 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), and voluntary programs such as Energy Star (see U.S. EPA, 
2001). In the case of mandatory information disclosure programs, firms are required to report 
information that is potentially damaging to them. Thus, an understanding of firm incentives 
under such programs is essential to evaluating their performance, improving their design, and 
motivating the emergence of new programs. 
  
A number of factors have the potential to alter the effectiveness of environmental information 
disclosure programs in encouraging firms to adopt desirable behaviors. These factors include 
features related to program design such as the timing of information release, firm characteristics 
such as size, and the existence of complementary policies such as liability rules. These factors 
may affect the quantity of firm emissions, the firm’s decision of whether to comply with 
reporting requirements, and the accuracy of reported emissions. Some of the factors that may 
affect the firm’s pollution and/or reporting decision such as financial status, compliance costs, 
and history of detected violations for example, have received limited attention in the literature 
(see Shavell, 1984; Beard, 1990; Larson, 1996; Harrington, 1988; Helland, 1998). To date, the 
 literature has primarily focused on pollution and/or reporting decisions at the firm level. We seek 
to build on this literature by examining the pollution/reporting decision of individuals within the 
firm. We argue that a firm’s internal organizational structure alters the incentives faced by 
decision-makers and therefore has the potential to affect their compliance decisions. We adapt a 
model developed by Gilpatric (2005) to examine these incentives and test the resulting 
hypotheses using experimental data. 
 
The next section motivates our work with an overview of the information disclosure and 
tournament literatures. In the third section, we first examine opportunities for malfeasance in the 
context of information disclosure programs. Then, we turn to the firm’s organizational structure 
and present a model where incentives of lower-level or division managers, who report to an 
owner-manager, are determined by a rank-order tournament. From this model, we derive testable 
hypotheses of behavior that vary with the payoffs received by division managers (based on rank 
and whether a manager is found to have engaged in malfeasance), the probability that 
malfeasance is detected, and the penalty imposed on a manager caught engaging in malfeasance. 
We test these predictions using laboratory experiments and report results in the fourth section. In 
the final section, we offer some conclusions and discuss the next steps in this line of research.   
 
MOTIVATION 
Previous studies of information disclosure programs have focused primarily on investigating two 
empirical questions. First, what is the reaction of investors to the release of information 
regarding a firm’s environmental performance (Hamilton, 1995; Khanna et al., 1998; Konar and 
Cohen, 2001)? Khanna et al. (1998) list several motivations for this line of research. For 
 example, investors may expect firms with poor environmental performance to face increased 
future compliance costs and greater risk of liabilities. In addition, investors may perceive poor 
environmental performance as an indication of inefficient input use. Regardless of the reason, 
investors react to information concerning the firm’s financial health such that the value of the 
firm (share prices) tends to fall when adverse environmental information (such as TRI reports) is 
made publicly available.1  
 
The second question relates to the effect of public information disclosure on subsequent firm 
environmental performance. Using data from the TRI, Konar and Cohen (1997) find that future 
emissions were lower among firms with the largest stock price decreases on the day of the 
information release.  
  
Empirical analyses of compliance with information disclosure programs are less common due to 
the lack of detailed compliance data and the difficulties associated with detecting noncompliance 
through misreporting rather than through failing to report at all. Estimates from the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) suggest that approximately a third of facilities subject to reporting 
under the TRI during its initial years failed to report (GAO, 1991). However, an analysis of TRI 
compliance of facilities in Minnesota by Brehm and Hamilton (1996) suggests that ignorance of 
the requirements of the regulation may better explain violations (measured as failure to report) 
than evasion. Their analysis suggests that facility size may be an important factor in compliance. 
They find that both the smallest hazardous waste generators in their sample, who they argue have 
lower compliance costs, and the firms with the largest sales volumes, who they maintain are 
more likely to employ a dedicated environmental staff, are less likely to violate. Brehm and 
 Hamilton also find that subsidiaries of larger companies are less likely to violate, perhaps 
because the larger company provides environmental and legal staff to the subsidiaries. They 
maintain that this finding supports the argument that firms with more information (less 
ignorance) are more likely to comply.  However, it seems reasonable that access to parent 
company environmental and legal staff may also reduce compliance costs thus increasing the 
likelihood of compliance. 
 
While a potentially important consideration, to our knowledge the literature has overlooked the 
possible role of a firm’s internal organizational structure in creating a divergence between 
manager incentives and the objectives of an information disclosure program. Consider that many 
internal reward structures (including promotion ladders) imply that division managers are 
playing a rank-order tournament game. Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that such mechanisms can 
induce efficient behavior when all managerial actions directed toward winning the game are in 
the form of productive effort. However, if purported performance is improved via fraudulent 
reporting or other malfeasance such as cost savings through higher and unreported toxics 
releases, compensation mechanisms based on tournament structures can induce managers to 
engage in such malfeasance. A substantial literature has compared the efficiency of tournaments 
with alternative incentive schemes, such as piece rates, with regard to such factors as the risk-
aversion of workers and the flexibility of the incentive framework to environmental uncertainty 
(e.g. Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). However, little work has explored incentives in a tournament 
setting when workers choose not solely how much work effort to exert, but some other aspect of 
the work that is undertaken. Managers may be able to influence the mean output through choices 
other than work effort, such as through choice of production process or regulatory compliance.  
  
When monitoring is imperfect it is likely that manager incentives are not perfectly aligned with 
those of the firm because there are opportunities to increase the probability of winning the 
tournament by engaging in activities that do not serve the firm’s interest. In general, this type of 
malfeasance may take the form of a manager increasing division profits by illegally dumping 
waste, failing to adequately maintain equipment, or manipulating accounts to show larger current 
revenues at the expense of future revenues. All such activities may increase the manager’s output 
as observed by his employer, while imposing potentially large future liabilities on the firm.2  
 
In the context of compliance with information disclosure programs (and other regulatory 
mandates), the program may have sufficient sanctions for non-compliance such that compliance 
is optimal at firm level assuming the firm can costlessly monitor manager behavior.  However, to 
achieve full compliance it may be very costly to monitor the behavior of division managers.3 To 
the extent that non-compliance may improve managers’ apparent output or productivity and such 
behavior is costly to observe, firms face a trade-off as compensation schemes that encourage 
greater managerial effort also generate an incentive for non-compliance. 
 
The most significant line of research regarding malfeasance in tournament settings involves the 
exploration of “influence activities”: behavior that arises when workers can influence the choice 
of superiors regarding who is promoted or otherwise rewarded in an organization through actions 
which are non-productive, ranging from ingratiation to bribery and sabotage of competitors 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; Prendergast and Topel, 1996; Kim et al., 2002; and Chen, 2003). 
Such behavior is costly to the firm because it dulls a worker’s incentives to exert productive 
 effort to win the tournament. The malfeasance we discuss here differs from influence activities 
because it does not derive from an agency conflict (i.e., the fact that the individual making 
decisions about whom to promote or otherwise reward benefits from the behavior at the expense 
of the firm). Malfeasance in the form of non-compliance with regulatory mandates, including 
failing to accurately disclose information, imposes direct costs on the firm that may significantly 
exceed those resulting from dulled incentives. Environmental malfeasance of course also entails 
important social costs which do not arise from influence activities within a firm and which are 
clearly of significant concern to regulators.  
 
FIRM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
Non-compliance and Malfeasance in the Context of Information Disclosure  
 
While the compliance literature has relied primarily on a framework that focuses on firm-level 
decision-making, the firm may be an inappropriate unit of account. The firm may wish to limit 
emissions to avoid associated penalties and potential liability. However, any internal 
organizational structure that includes incentive-based compensation, in which managers’ 
payments depend on their output, may provide managers with incentives to engage in 
malfeasance. Gilpatric (2005) constructs such a model of the firm to examine the general case of 
corporate governance. Here, we define malfeasance as a behavior that is inconsistent with the 
firm’s objectives. If managers can increase their apparent output (such as the profits from their 
division) by increasing emissions or reducing care (and thus increasing the probability of 
accidental emissions) and if this behavior is sufficiently costly for the firm to monitor and 
prevent such that monitoring is imperfect, then any compensation that rewards managers for 
 higher output will generate both the intended incentive for them to exert greater work effort, but 
also an incentive to engage in malfeasance.   
 
We focus on the incentives generated by a rank order tournament compensation scheme (such as 
promotion ladders) for two reasons: 1) competing for promotion, bonuses, or other rewards is 
perhaps the most ubiquitous incentive mechanism within firms, and 2) tournaments have the 
characteristic that players’ incentives to “cheat” depends not on the absolute gain from doing so 
(as would be true for piece-rate compensation, for example) but on the advantage cheating 
provides relative to competitors. Therefore, in an evenly matched tournament individuals can 
face a strong incentive to cheat even if doing so achieves only a small output gain if this is 
sufficient to significantly increase their probability of winning. The opportunities for 
malfeasance that arise when we extend the model to include internal organization may result in 
higher levels of overall emissions and/or more frequent misreporting as divisions compete to 
reduce current production costs. 
 
Let x represent the firm’s (owner-manager’s) optimal total emissions level. Let z represent the 
level of emissions that is optimal (at the firm-level) to report to the environmental authority with 
xz ≤ . Assume that the firm is composed of N divisions, each of which has a designated manager 
with the responsibility of reporting emissions for his division to the owner-manger. Let iz
∧
 
represent emissions reported by the thi  division manager. ix
∧
 represents the optimal level of 
emissions for division i from the perspective of the division manager. The owner-manager 
reports firm-level emissions to the environmental authority as required by the information 
 disclosure program. In order to focus on the effect of division manager-level decision-making, 
we assume that the owner-manager reports ∑
=
∧∧ =
N
i
izz
1
 to the environmental authority.4    
 
By considering the emissions and reporting decisions of lower-level managers, we introduce 
several opportunities for non-compliance. First, as shown above, non-compliance may result 
from behavior on the part of the owner-manager. We do not explicitly model this form of non-
compliance here. Second, even if the owner-manager wishes to report the level of emissions 
truthfully, malfeasance on the part of division managers may prevent him from doing so. 
Managers are said to be engaging in malfeasance or cheating if they 1) emit more than optimal 
from the firm’s perspective and/or 2) fail to report their actual emissions. Table 1 illustrates the 
possible cheating and non-compliance cases where ∑
=
∧∧ =
N
i
izz
1
 represents the level of reported 
emissions based on the division manager reports and ∑
=
∧∧ =
N
i
ixx
1
 is actual emissions of the firm. In 
the first three cases, division managers are cheating or engaging in malfeasance. In cases 2 and 3 
the firm is misreporting its emissions and therefore is noncompliant with the information 
disclosure program. Note that even in cases 1 and 4 where the firm is compliant with the 
reporting requirements, the level of emissions need not equal the socially optimal level. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
By adapting the model of Gilpatric (2005), we derive hypotheses regarding the likelihood of 
cheating on the part of managers who are playing a rank-order tournament game in terms of their 
financial compensation. We make the following assumptions. Division managers are directed to 
 emit no more than xi, where xi represents the optimal level of emissions for division i from the 
perspective of the owner-manager. They are able to improve their output by increasing emissions 
up to a level of ixˆ . It is costly for the firm to audit the behavior of division managers and it does 
so with probability η. If managers are found to have “cheated” by emitting more than xi or by 
misreporting they are disqualified from winning the tournament (e.g., being promoted) and may 
also face additional sanction (e.g., being fined or fired). Because managers face the same penalty 
if found to have cheated regardless of the magnitude of cheating there is no marginal deterrent 
and the manager’s decision reduces to choosing xi as directed by the firm or cheating by 
choosing ixˆ . In this setting malfeasance always consists of both emitting more than is optimal 
for the firm and failing to truthfully report emissions (Case 2 above). In what follows, we focus 
exclusively on the second case in Table 1 above, leaving additional discussion and experimental 
testing of the remaining cases to future research. 
 
Malfeasance with Managerial Compensation Based on Tournament Payoffs 
Gilpatric (2005) develops a model of cheating in a tournament in which identical contestants first 
choose effort then, after observing their opponents’ effort, choose whether to cheat. Cheating is 
modeled as simply increasing output by a constant. The model developed in that paper shows 
how the likelihood of cheating depends on the payoffs at stake in the tournament, the variance of 
output, probability of cheating being detected, number of contestants, and the penalty associated 
with being found to have cheated. The direction of these effects is generally quite intuitive. The 
probability of cheating decreases as the probability of detection grows, the gain from cheating 
decreases, or the cost of being caught cheating increases. However it remains an important 
question whether these effects are observed empirically and how well the model captures 
 behavior. One expects that a greater likelihood of cheating being detected or stiffer penalties if 
caught will deter cheating to some degree, but increasing our understanding of exactly how 
behavior responds to changes in the competitive framework is quite valuable for understanding 
how competitive incentive systems can elicit effort while minimizing malfeasance and 
monitoring costs.  
 
In this paper we consider a special case of the model in which three contestants compete in a 
rank-order tournament. Contestants play only the second stage of the game in which they choose 
whether or not to “cheat”.5 Players choose a distribution of output, denoted y, among two 
distributions, a “high” distribution and a “low” distribution. Cheating entails choosing the high 
distribution. Here we illustrate this application of the model and show how the predicted 
probability of cheating is derived conditional on the underlying parameters of the model. 
 
We first develop some notation. An “audit” of contest behavior occurs with probability η, and if 
an audit occurs all contestants who cheated are discovered to have done so. This parameter 
represents the intensity of monitoring activity undertaken by the tournament sponsor.6 If a player 
is found to have cheated he faces two possible types of sanctions: 1) a cheating player is 
disqualified from winning the tournament and receives the payoff associated with finishing last; 
2) the player may face additional “outside” penalty in excess of any compensation at stake in the 
tournament. Outside penalties represent such factors as a negative reputation arising from being 
found to have cheated. Let r represent the outside penalty imposed on a player caught cheating. 
The contestant with the highest output who is eligible to win (i.e., not caught cheating) receives 
 payoff w1, those who do not win but are not caught cheating receive w2, and a player caught 
cheating receives w2-r. Let s represent the payoff spread, w1-w2. 
 
To solve for strategies as a function of the tournament parameters we first identify the minimum 
probability of audit that will fully deter cheating. This is found by deriving the audit probability 
such that, if a contestant believes his opponents will not cheat then he is indifferent between 
cheating and not (i.e., his expected payoffs are identical). If the audit probability is greater than 
this value, which we will denote ηa, not cheating is a dominant strategy. Let ( )⋅⋅,P  represent 
player i’s probability of finishing first (but not necessarily receiving w1 since this probability 
does not account for the possibility of disqualification if cheating). The first argument of P 
denotes the action of player i and the second argument gives the action of his opponents. Then 
player i’s expected payoff if he cheats when his opponents do not is ( ) ( ) rwSNCCP ηη −+− 2,1  
whereas player i’s expected payoff if he does not cheat when his opponents do not is 
( ) 2, wSNCNCP + . In this symmetric contest, P(NC,NC)=1/N. Finding P(C,NC) is rather more 
complicated. In general player i’s probability of having the highest draw when he receives a 
draw from density function f(y) and faces N-1 opponents k of whom cheat and who each receive 
a draw from a distribution G(y) if they do not cheat or H(y) if they do cheat is 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )∫ −−= dyyHyGyfP kkNi 1 . (1) 
We can now set the expected payoff from cheating equal to that from not cheating to solve for 
ηa. The model predicts that cheating will be fully deterred (i.e., a player’s dominant strategy is to 
not cheat) if the probability of detection is at least 
  
srNCCP
NNCCP
a /),(
/1),(
+
−=η . (2) 
 We can employ similar calculations to find the audit probability below which cheating is a 
dominant strategy, which we denote ηb. This is the value where player i is indifferent between 
cheating and not cheating if he believes all his opponents will cheat. Cheating will be a dominant 
strategy if the probability of audit is less than  
 ( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ] ( ) SrSCNCPCCP
CNCPCCP
b /,,
,,
++−
−=η .  (3) 
Note that ηb<ηa. 
 
For audit probabilities between aη  and bη  there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where each 
player cheats with probability ρ such that players’ expected payoffs for cheating and non-
cheating are equal. In other words, players are indifferent between cheating and not cheating for 
audit probabilities in this range. Note that the more a contestant believes his opponents will cheat 
the lower the payoff he receives from cheating and the higher the payoff from not cheating. This 
yields the existence of a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium toward which behavior should 
converge over time if the game is played repeatedly and players update their beliefs regarding 
the rate of cheating among other contestants. If contestants conclude that their opponents are 
cheating more frequently than with probability ρ they will do better to not cheat, and if they 
conclude that they are cheating less frequently, they do better to cheat. We now illustrate how we 
solve for the equilibrium probability of cheating, ρ, as a function of the tournament parameters.  
 
When player i faces N-1 opponents the probability that k of them cheat given that each opponent 
cheats with probability ρ is defined by the binomial function b(k,N-1,ρ). For expositional ease 
and consistency with our experimental application, let 3=N . In this context, ( )⋅⋅⋅ ,,P  continues to 
 represent the probability that player i wins the tournament.  However, now the first argument 
represents player i’s strategy and the second and third arguments denote his opponents’ 
respective strategies. If i does not cheat given each of his opponents cheat with probability ρ, 
then his expected payoff is  
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } 2,2,2,,2,1,,,2,0
,,,2,2
,,,2,1,,,2,0
1
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CNCNCPbNCNCNCPb
S
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+
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⎧
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ρρρη
ρ
ρρη
.   (4) 
In the absence of an audit, the probability of winning (the first bracketed term) is the sum of the 
probabilities of winning given each possible combination of cheating and non-cheating 
opponents, with each term weighted by the probability of that occurrence. The second term in 
brackets, indicating the probability of winning if an audit occurs, is similar except that cheating 
opponents are disqualified so the P terms are quite different (and in the final case where both 
opponents cheat player i wins with probability 1 if there is an audit). We can similarly find that 
the expected payoff to player i if he cheats is in this context is 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 2,,,2,2
,,,2,1,,,2,0
1 wr
CCCPb
CNCCPbNCNCCPb
S +−⎭⎬
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⎧
+
+− ηρ
ρρη .   (5) 
Setting these two expressions equal to each other (as they must be in equilibrium) and 
rearranging we have  
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 Solving this equation for ρ provides an expression for the equilibrium probability of cheating 
given values for η, r, and s. In the next section, we discuss the results of experiments designed to 
test hypotheses that stem from the theoretical model. 
 
LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS 
Testing the theoretical model with field data is clearly problematic for a variety of reasons. Most 
important of these, perhaps, is that it is impossible to know for certain how much cheating takes 
place in any context without perfect monitoring of behavior. It is the absence of such monitoring, 
of course, that describes the circumstances the model seeks to capture. Economics experiments 
allow us to control the parameters of the competition and observe all behavior by contestants to 
learn whether they respond as theory predicts. A key to the use of the results of laboratory 
experiments to inform the policy debate is the precept of parallelism (Smith, 1982; Plott, 1987; 
Cummings, McKee, and Taylor, 2001). We establish parallelism through ensuring that the 
essential features of the field environment are captured in the lab. The experiments designed for 
this line of research focus on the strategic elements of the theory: we test behavioral arguments.  
 
Experimental Design 
Our laboratory experiments are designed to test the responsiveness of the frequency of cheating 
to changes in the probability of audit and the imposition of an outside penalty for managers 
caught cheating. Participants are randomly assigned to three-player groups and play the role of 
division managers in a rank-order tournament. The decision faced by the participant is whether 
to receive an output draw from a “low” distribution, y~U[15,45], or a “high” distribution, 
y~U[22,52]. The choice of a draw from the high distribution corresponds with the decision to 
 cheat, for example by emitting more than permitted in order to increase productivity but falsely 
reporting lower emissions. As in the model described in the previous section, the group faces a 
random audit with probability η. If an audit occurs, cheaters are caught with a probability of one 
and are disqualified from the tournament. Further, cheaters face an outside penalty, r, which is 
equal to 0 or 5. The eligible (i.e., non-disqualified) participant with the highest output wins the 
tournament and receives the highest payoff. In particular, the winner receives a payoff of 19 lab 
dollars and other participants receive seven lab dollars less any penalty if they are disqualified. 
 
Using the experiment parameters above, we can apply the formulas from the theory section to 
obtain values for win probabilities for player i. In the case where i cheats and his opponents do 
not we have that f(y) = 1/30 and G(y) = (y-15)/30 for 22 ≤  y < 45 and G(y) = 1 for y ≥ 45. Thus, 
the win probability for player i given his opponents do not cheat is 
 ( ) 562.
30
7
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2
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22
≈+⎟⎠
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⎛ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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In the case where i does not cheat and his opponents do we have that f(y) = 1/30 and H(y) = (y-
22)/30 for 22 ≤  y ≤ 45 and f(y) = 0 for y ≥ 45, such that the win probability for player i is 
 ( ) 150.
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With P(C,NC) and P(NC,C) in hand, we can solve for ηa and ηb using formulas (2) and (3), 
respectively. For the case where r = 0 we have that ηa ≈ 0.407 and ηb ≈ 0.155. When r = 5 we 
have that ηa ≈ 0.234 and ηb ≈ 0.114. Similarly, using expression (6) above and the parameters of 
each experimental session we can calculate the predicted frequency of cheating, ρ, in a mixed 
 strategy equilibrium where one exists (i.e., where the session is not designed to elicit a dominant 
strategy).  
 
We investigate audit probabilities that fall inside and outside the ηa and ηb ranges above. In 
particular, for r = 0, we include treatments corresponding to η = 0.1, 0.2, 0.32, and 0.5. As the 
audit probability 0.1 is less than ηb and 0.5 is greater than ηa it follows that for these parameter 
values there is a dominant strategy to cheat and not cheat, respectively. Audit probabilities of 0.2 
and 0.32 give rise to unique mixed strategy equilibria. For r = 5 we include treatments 
corresponding to η = 0.2 and 0.3. With η = 0.2 there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium 
whereas for η = 0.3 there is a dominant strategy to not cheat. The unique mixed strategy 
equilibria are solved for using formula (6). The design parameters and predicted cheating 
probabilities for the six treatments are summarized in Table 2.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Although our theoretical model describes a one-shot game, we allow for possible learning 
through repeated play over T identical decision periods. Repetition appears to be important here 
given some equilibrium predictions are predicated on mixing strategies. To thwart motivations 
for strategic-play and efforts at tacit coordination, in each period participants are randomly and 
anonymously re-assigned to tournament groups.  
 
Experiment instructions are presented both orally and in writing. Decisions are made via laptop 
computers using software programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). Note that while we make 
analogies here to managerial decisions on environmental compliance, instructions use neutral 
 language. The decision to receive a high draw is not framed as cheating or malfeasance so as not 
to engender uncontrolled payoffs associated with ethical costs of choosing to cheat. Similarly, 
we characterize the audit simply as a computer “check” of which distribution was chosen. After 
each period, the participant receives feedback on: (1) his output; (2) his output rank; (3) whether 
there was an audit; (4) whether he was disqualified; (5) how many opponents were disqualified; 
and (6) his payoff.  
 
Ninety-six undergraduate student subjects at the University of Tennessee participated in 
experiments in the Summer and Fall of 2005. Participants were drawn from a large pool of 
volunteers and represent a wide range of academic majors. The experiments were conducted in a 
designated experimental economics laboratory. Sessions consisted of nine to fifteen people, and 
participants were visually isolated through the use of dividers. Matching was anonymous; 
subjects were not aware of the identity of the other members of their group. The experiment 
lasted 30 to 60 minutes, and subjects received average compensation of approximately $15. Due 
to time considerations, the experiment lasted either 20 or 30 periods. 
 
Experiment Results 
The results are summarized in Table 3. As we observe, the subjects do not behave exactly as the 
theory predicts. In particular, using Wilcoxon tests where the unit of measurement is cheating 
frequency for the individual over all decision periods, we find that predicted and observed 
cheating is statistically different for all treatments at the 5 percent significance level, with the 
exception of Treatment 2. Note that observed cheating probabilities vary very little across rounds 
such that the results of statistical tests do not depend on which periods are considered. 
 Nevertheless, our results are generally supportive of the theory as it predicts responses to 
changes in the audit probability. For example, actual cheating drops from 63 percent (Treatment 
2) to 42 percent (Treatment 3) when the audit probability increases from 20 percent to 32 
percent. This difference is statistically significant using a two-sample Wilcoxon Test (z = 2.10, 
prob. = 0.036). The effect of an outside penalty appears to be less pronounced. For instance, with 
η = 0.2, the penalty decreases cheating by 0.1. However, for η = 0.3, cheating actually increases 
by 0.12. In both cases, the effect of the penalty is not statistically significant. Overall there is a 
tendency towards an indifference between cheating or not, with observed rates of cheating below 
the predicted level when the theory predicts cheating the majority of the time (Treatments 1 and 
2) and observed rates of cheating above the predicted level when the theory predicts cheating a 
minority of the time (Treatments 3 to 6). 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
We turn now to a more formal analysis of individual behavior and estimate a probit model of the 
decision to cheat. To account for unobserved subject heterogeneity, and to allow for possible 
distribution misspecification, we estimate the parameter covariance matrix using White’s robust 
“sandwich” estimator adjusted for clustering at the individual level. As participant behavior may 
be influenced by experience in prior periods, and in particular the feedback received after each 
period, the model controls for factors related to history of play as well as policy parameters. In 
terms of policy variables, we include an indicator for the presence of a penalty and a variable 
corresponding to the audit probability. Feedback variables include the proportion of prior “wins 
by opponent disqualification” whereby the participant won only as the result of competitors with 
higher output being disqualified, and the proportion of prior “wins by cheating” whereby the 
 participant won as a result of cheating. These variables correspond to signals of how background 
win probabilities change conditional on the decisions of other players. As the effects of the 
exogenous audit probability and the two subjective win probabilities may have more pronounced 
short-term effects, we also include three indicator variables corresponding to whether there was 
an audit, whether the subject won by disqualification, and whether the subject won by cheating 
in the previous period.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 4 presents our estimated probit coefficients and corresponding marginal effects. As 
predicted, participants respond to the higher audit probability by reducing their probability of 
cheating. However, the marginal effect suggests that changes in the audit probability has an 
effect on cheating less pronounced than predicted by theory. In particular, consider the mean 
audit probability across all non-penalty treatments, which is about 0.28 with an associated 
cheating probability of roughly 0.5. If the audit probability is increased (decreased) by about 
0.13, the theory predicts a decrease (increase) in cheating by about 0.5. However, the model 
suggests that observed cheating would only increase (decrease) by 0.06 for such a change in the 
audit probability. If an individual was audited in the previous period, the model suggests an 
effect inconsistent with theory: he is more likely to cheat in the current period. This is the oft 
observed “gambler’s fallacy” behavior, the presence of which at least partially explains why 
observed cheating is lower than predicted for low audit probabilities and higher than predicted 
for high audit probabilities. In particular, according to the estimated marginal effect, the presence 
(absence) of an audit in the previous period increases (decreases) the probability of cheating by 
0.185. Consistent with our nonparametric test results, the presence of the penalty has no 
 statistically significant effect on the cheating probability. This result is surprising, but has a 
parallel in the law and economics literature where some studies find that increased penalties for 
criminal offences (such as the death penalty) have little or no deterrent effect on crime rates 
(Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich, 2003). 
 
Additionally, the proportion of wins by disqualification and proportion of wins by cheating 
statistically decreases and increases, respectively, the probability of cheating. There is nearly a 
one-to-one relationship, which is quite rational, between changes in these subjective win 
probabilities and changes in cheating probabilities. In particular, for a 0.1 increase in the 
proportion of wins by disqualification the model estimates that cheating decreases by 0.08. 
Similarly, a 0.1 increase in the proportion of wins by cheating corresponds with an increase in 
cheating by 0.09. As these ceteris paribus interpretations are a bit confounded by the presence of 
the lagged indicator variables associated with the two subjective probability variables, we note 
that the changes in cheating become 0.1 and 0.09 when the indicator variables are excluded from 
the model. Finally, we note that a participant winning by disqualification is even more likely to 
not cheat in the following period.  
 
IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENTIONS 
This paper embarks on preliminary steps towards improving the design and implementation of 
environmental information disclosure programs. By examining manager-level emissions and 
compliance decisions, we obtain predictions of firm characteristics, namely features of their 
organizational structures that induce greater non-compliance with environmental regulations and 
information disclosure programs.  
  
One implication of our model is that the optimal intensity of regulatory enforcement efforts 
depends on the magnitude of monitoring and enforcement within firms. Firms with managerial 
compensation systems that generate strong competitive incentives for cheating despite firm-level 
compliance with disclosure requirements and other regulatory mandates, and which have little 
internal monitoring of managerial behavior, merit greater regulatory scrutiny than those which 
more intensively monitor internal behavior. One might also draw an analogy with enforcement of 
another type of information disclosure mandate, that of financial disclosure. To a large extent 
financial disclosure requirements are implemented through the requirement that publicly traded 
firms are subject to an independent audit by an outside auditor. Audits of behavior by the 
regulators (i.e. The SEC) are very infrequent. Clearly this system is imperfect, as the recent high-
profile accounting scandals involving Enron, WorldCom and others make clear. Nevertheless, it 
remains true that mandating credible monitoring of internal firm behavior, such as through 
independent auditing, may be an effective means of increasing compliance with information 
disclosure and other regulatory requirements. 
 
Our results can inform the debate on the efficient design of auditing procedures for verification 
of the information reported by firms as required under a mandatory disclosure program. The 
similarities of the underlying decision structure between compliance with corporate tax 
regulations and environmental reporting regulations suggests that we can gain some insight on 
how to design appropriate audits from the tax compliance literature. As Alm and McKee (1998) 
have argued we can learn a great deal about managerial decisions (especially regulatory 
compliance decisions) from the extensive research work on tax compliance.  
  
The reporting requirements under the various environmental regulations are applied at the firm 
level. Our analytical framework examines behavior at the sub-firm (e.g., division) level.  
However, our work suggests that there are systematic links between the organizational structure 
of the firm and its overall environmental malfeasance and reporting behavior. Specifically, our 
work suggests that the method of compensation of divisional leaders and the number and size of 
divisions will affect the firm’s overall level of compliance. For many publicly held firms the 
general form of the compensation structure will be public information as will be the divisional 
structure. Our discussion of the effects of rank-order tournament compensation schemes on 
managerial reporting incentives provides some simple insights for the design of an auditing 
program. 
 
First, one can improve the efficiency of the audit process through the use of systematic or 
endogenous audits (selecting firms based on observable characteristics). Stranlund and co-
authors (Murphy and Stranlund, 2004, 2005; Stranlund and Dhanda,1999) argue that compliance 
in an emissions trading environment is independent of firm characteristics. This finding suggests 
that systematic audit rules will not be productive. However, the emissions trading environment 
differs from simple information disclosure environments. In the case of emissions trading, 
targeted enforcement does not enhance efficiency because the market for permits yields an 
equilibrium price such that there are no differential incentives to evade. No such market occurs 
in response to mandatory information disclosure programs. For these programs, evasion costs 
and benefits do differ across firms at the margin and these differences may be reflected in 
observable firm characteristics as suggested by our theoretical development and experimental 
 results. The structure of the internal organization, in particular the managerial incentives, will 
affect the propensity to emit and to underreport. 
 
Second, considerable research in tax compliance behavior (e.g., Alm and McKee, 2004, 1998; 
Alm, Jackson and McKee 2004, 1992; Alm, Cronshaw and McKee, 1993; Chen and Chu, 2005) 
has shown that individuals and firms respond in predictable ways to the elements of audit 
regimes. If the results of this literature apply to the setting of compliance with information 
disclosure programs, then we would expect increased enforcement effort (such as the use of 
penalties and random audits) to increase compliance. Of particular relevance to the information 
disclosure programs is the lag in the audit process. Even if compliance with the reporting 
requirement is perfect (the firm reports exactly what is released), the owner-manager could 
benefit from releases that lower cost of production if the releases are reported to the public with a 
sufficient lag. A sufficiently long lag may allow the owner-manager to realize his payoff from 
the assets owned and exit the firm prior to the release of the information and the subsequent 
negative effect on the firm’s value. This suggests that the reporting period should be shortened 
and audit resources optimized through the use of staggered reporting dates. In this way, the 
information concerning emissions would be provided to the market in a timely fashion and the 
anticipated effects on share values realized quickly. 
 
An important distinction between tax compliance and compliance with information reporting 
requirements is that, in some cases, non-compliance with reporting requirements could result in 
damages that are not easily reversed. In the case of income tax evasion, the evader can make the 
government whole through the payment of back taxes and interest. The government may also 
 argue for the imposition of additional fines given the incomplete detection and punishment 
regimes (much like punitive damages in tort litigation). In the case of non-compliance with 
environmental reporting requirements, ex post actions will not likely make the public whole. 
However, the liability system may apply additional penalties on firms that have violated the 
regulatory standards and failed to comply with reporting requirements.  
 
Information disclosure programs, such as the TRI, have the potential to achieve significant 
improvements in the environmental behavioral of firms. The extent to which this potential is 
realized depends on the extent to which the information is accurate and timely. All firms will 
wish to report only information that casts them in a favorable light and must be “encouraged” to 
provide truthful and timely information. Our research is directed to improving the performance 
of information disclosure programs through both the identification of firm characteristics that are 
more likely to be correlated with environmental malfeasance and incomplete information 
disclosure as well as the identification of the properties of information disclosure programs that 
enhance compliance. The former investigations will suggest ways the audit regimes can be 
improved while the latter will suggest design elements of the information disclosure program. 
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 ENDNOTES 
 
1 Of course the market will anticipate positive emissions levels in many cases and the reaction of 
the market will depend on the extent to which reported emissions differ from expectations. 
 
2 Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) term this issue the influence of prize on choice of technique, but 
do not model the problem. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) address a related problem of the influence 
of the interest rate in bank lending on the risk involved in projects undertaken by borrowers.  
 
3 Of course the cost of monitoring the regulatory compliance behavior of managers can be 
thought of as simply one aspect of the total cost of regulatory compliance for the firm. Our point 
here is to separate the costs of implementing full compliance within the managerial incentive 
system from the direct costs of regulatory compliance (such as costs associated with using 
“cleaner” production technology).  
 
4 Internal environmental auditing procedures may increase the validity of this assumption to the 
extent that the existence of internal records of division managers’ reports discourages the owner-
manager from choosing to report a level of emissions inconsistent with these reports.  Anton et 
al. (2004) suggest that elements of the internal organization of firms’ environmental programs 
are important in explaining TRI emissions. 
 
5 Gilpatric (2005) finds that in equilibrium all players choose identical effort in the first stage of 
the tournament and therefore play a symmetric cheating game in the second stage. Our focus 
 here is on testing predicted behavior in this symmetric cheating game. Clearly players may not 
choose identical effort levels, and other circumstances may well occur which render contestants 
unequal when choosing whether to cheat, but we leave the study of behavior arising in such a 
setting to future research.  
 
6 Gilpatric (2005) discusses how behavior differs when audits are independent and shows that 
correlated audits as discussed here (in which all players are audited or none are) more effectively 
deter cheating than independent audits of equal probability.  
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 TABLES 
Table 1.  Potential Cheating and Non-compliance Cases 
 
Case Relationship between 
x  and 
∧
x  
Relationship between 
∧
x  and 
∧
z  
Are managers 
cheating? 
Is firm compliant 
with reporting 
requirement? 
1 xx >∧  ∧∧ = xz  Yes Yes 
2 xx >∧  ∧∧ < xz  Yes No 
3 xx =∧  ∧∧ < xz  Yes No 
4 xx =∧  ∧∧ = xz  No Yes 
 
Table 2. Design Parameters by Treatment 
Treatment N per 
contest 
Audit 
Prob. η 
Payoffs: 
(Win, Not Win, 
Ineligible) 
Payoff 
Spread  
(s) 
Penalty 
(r) 
Predicted 
Prob. of 
Cheating (ρ) 
1 3 0.10 (19,7,7) 12 0 1.00 
2 3 0.20 (19,7,7) 12 0 0.76 
3 3 0.32 (19,7,7) 12 0 0.29 
4 3 0.20 (19,7,2) 12 5 0.27 
5 3 0.30 (19,7,2) 12 5 0.00 
6 3 0.50 (19,7,7) 12 0 0.00 
 
Table 3. Observed Cheating In Experiments 
 
Treatment # 
Subjects 
# 
Periods 
Observed 
Prob. of 
Cheating 
Predicted 
Prob. of 
Cheating 
Wilcoxon Test:  
Observed v. Predicted  
(z-statistic) 
1 15 30 0.74 1.00 -3.26 
2 18 20 0.63 0.76 -1.55 
3 18 20 0.42 0.29 2.16 
4 18 20 0.53 0.27 2.94 
5 12 30 0.54 0.00 3.07 
6 15 30 0.46 0.00 3.41 
 
 Table 4. Probit Model Results 
Variable Coefficient 
(Robust Standard Error)
Marginal Effect 
(Robust Standard Error) 
Penalty  -0.115 
(0.116) 
-0.045 
(0.046) 
Audit Probability -1.239* 
(0.409) 
-0.488* 
(0.160) 
Audit in Previous Period 0.485* 
(0.107) 
0.185* 
(0.039) 
Proportion of Wins by Opponent 
Disqualification in Prior Periods 
-1.993* 
(0.76) 
-0.785* 
(0.299) 
Win by Opponent Disqualification 
in Previous Period 
 -0.612* 
(0.152) 
-0.239* 
(0.056) 
Proportion of Wins by Cheating in 
Prior Periods 
2.160* 
(0.321) 
0.851* 
(0.127) 
Win by Cheating in Previous Period 0.131 
(0.092) 
0.051 
(0.036) 
Constant 0.109 
(0.162) 
 
Wald χ2 (7 d.f.) 131.20*  
Pseudo R2 0.118  
Number of Observations 2244  
An asterisk indicates the parameter is statistically different from zero at the 5% level.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
